

The NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program

An Overview

Kenneth A. LaBel

ken.label@nasa.gov

301-286-9936

Michael J. Sampson

michael.j.sampson@nasa.gov

301-614-6233

Co- Managers, NEPP Program

NASA/GSFC

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<https://nepp.nasa.gov>

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Acronyms

| Acronym | Definition |
|----------|--|
| Aero | Aerospace |
| AFRL | Air Force Research Laboratory |
| BME | Base Metal Electrode |
| BOK | Body of Knowledge |
| CBRAM | Conductive Bridging Random Access Memory |
| CCMC | Community Coordinated Modeling Center |
| CDH | Central DuPage Hospital Proton Facility, Chicago Illinois |
| CMOS | Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor |
| CNT | Carbon Nanotube |
| COP | Community of Practice |
| COTS | Commercial Off The Shelf |
| CRÈME | Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro Electronics |
| DC | Direct Current |
| DLA/DSCC | Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime |
| EEE | Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical |
| ELDRS | Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity |
| EP | Enhanced Plastic |
| EPARTS | NASA Electronic Parts Database |
| ESA | European Space Agency |
| FPGA | Field Programmable Gate Array |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GaN | Gallium Nitride |
| GSFC | Goddard Space Flight Center |
| HUPTI | Hampton University Proton Therapy Institute |
| IBM | International Business Machines |
| IPC | International Post Corporation |
| IUCF | Indiana University Cyclotron Facility |
| JEDEC | Joint Electron Device Engineering Council |
| JPL | Jet Propulsion Laboratories |
| LaRC | Langley Research Center |
| LEO | Low Earth Orbit |
| LLUMC | James M. Slater Proton Treatment and Research Center at Loma Linda University Medical Center |
| MGH | Massachusetts General Hospital |

| Acronym | Definition |
|------------|--|
| MIL | Military |
| MLCC | Multi-Layer Ceramic Capacitor |
| MOSFETS | Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistors |
| MRAM | Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory |
| MRQW | Microelectronics Reliability and Qualification Working Meeting |
| MSFC | Marshall Space Flight Center |
| NASA | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| NAVY Crane | Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana |
| NEPAG | NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group |
| NEPP | NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging |
| NPSL | NASA Parts Selection List |
| PBGA | Plastic Ball Grid Array |
| POC | Point of Contact |
| POL | Point of Load |
| ProCure | ProCure Center, Warrenville, Illinois |
| RERAM | Resistive Random Access Memory |
| RF | Radio Frequency |
| RHA | Radiation Hardness Assurance |
| SAS | Supplier Assessment System |
| SEE | Single Event Effect |
| SEU | Single Event Upset |
| SiC | Silicon Carbide |
| SME | Subject Matter Expert |
| SOC | Systems on a Chip |
| SOTA | State of the Art |
| SPOON | Space Parts on Orbit Now |
| SSDs | Solid State Disks |
| TI | Texas Instruments |
| TMR | Triple Modular Redundancy |
| TRIUMF | Tri-University Meson Facility |
| VCS | Voluntary Consensus Standard |
| VNAND | Vertical NAND |



INTRODUCTION TO NEPP




NEPP Program - Mission and Goals

- The NEPP Mission is to:
 - Provide guidance to NASA for the selection and application of microelectronics technologies
 - Improve understanding of the risks related to the use of these technologies in the space environment
 - Ensure that appropriate research is performed to meet NASA mission assurance needs.
- NEPP's Goals are to:
 - Provide customers with appropriate and cost-effective risk knowledge to aid in:
 - Selection and application of microelectronics technologies
 - Improved understanding of risks related to the use of these technologies in the space environment
 - Appropriate evaluations to meet NASA mission assurance needs
 - Guidelines for test and application of parts technologies in space
 - Assurance infrastructure and support for technologies in use by NASA space systems



Taking a Step Back...

A Simple View of NEPP's Perspective



NEPP Efforts Relate to Assurance of EEE Parts –
**It's not just the technology, but how to view the need for safe
insertion into space programs.**




Overview

NEPP consists of the following Activities:

| NEPP Activity | Description |
|-----------------------------|--|
| EEE Parts Reliability | New technology evaluation, test method development |
| EEE Radiation Effects | New technology evaluation, test method development |
| EEE Parts Packaging | New technology evaluation, test method development |
| EEE Parts Assurance (NEPAG) | Standardization, MIL spec coordination, problem investigations |
| Operational | Website, Admin, Events |



A View of NASA Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Needs – *Diversity!*



Without forgetting traditional LEO and Deep-Space Robotic needs



What EEE Parts Diversity Entails – NEPP Tenets for Planning Tasks


- **Tasks should**
 - Learn from the past,
 - Focus on the present, and,
 - Plan for the future.
- **Tasks should have widest applicability to Agency needs.**
 - Know our customer base: technologists, designers, engineers,...
 - No single NASA center interests or direct flight project support.
- **Tasks should leverage partnerships with other agencies, industry, and universities.**
 - Partnering with flight projects **ONLY** when the Agency as a whole benefits.

Note: A combined perspective on EEE parts allows an equal assurance/engineering approach to NEPP plans.



NEPP Overview (1)


NEPP provides the Agency infrastructure for assurance of EEE parts for space usage



NEPP and its subset (NEPAG) are the Agency's points of contact (POCs) for assurance and radiation tolerance of EEE parts and their packages.



NEPP Overview (2)



As opposed to a traditional breakdown of parts, packaging, or radiation, NEPP tasks can be categorized into these five areas.



EEE PARTS ASSURANCE AND RISK



Generalized EEE Parts Assurance Concept

- EEE parts assurance is a spectrum of trade spaces based on two considerations:
 - **Criticality:** whether the mission or application is in the “must work” category, and,
 - **Environment/Lifetime:** how harsh the space environment for the mission is, coupled with length of mission to qualify as success.
- A reminder
 - Additional environment protection can be anything from shielding to thermal control to fault tolerant design.
 - *Anomalies and failures are what happens when the protection isn't sufficient.*
- Affordable

AND, does it HAVE to work or do you just WANT it to work?




Applying These Concepts to EEE Parts

- The matrix on the following slide illustrates this using a modified risk approach (image on this slide).

NOTE:

- **Green:** Commercial off the shelf (COTS) electronics may be OK to use
- **Red:** Require traditional EEE parts assurance approaches (i.e., NASA Level 1 or 2 parts – equivalent to the Mil/Aero grade components for space).
- **Yellow:** May demand a mix of strategies
- While not specifically called out here, other grades between commercial and Mil/Aero such as automotive are part of the trade space.





Notional EEE Parts Usage Factors

Environment/Lifetime

Criticality

| | Low | Medium | High |
|--------|--|--|--|
| Low | COTS upscreening/ part testing optional; do no harm (to others) | COTS upscreening/ testing recommended; fault-tolerance suggested; do no harm (to others) | Rad hard suggested. COTS upscreening/ testing recommended; fault tolerance recommended |
| Medium | COTS upscreening/ testing recommended; fault- tolerance suggested | COTS upscreening/ testing recommended; fault-tolerance recommended | Level 1 or 2, rad hard suggested. Full upscreening for COTS. Fault tolerant designs for COTS. |
| High | Level 1 or 2 suggested. COTS upscreening/ testing recommended. Fault tolerant designs for COTS. | Level 1 or 2, rad hard suggested. Full upscreening for COTS. Fault tolerant designs for COTS. | Level 1 or 2, rad hard recommended. Full upscreening for COTS. Fault tolerant designs for COTS. |



Background on EEE Parts Grades

- **EEE parts are available in **grades**.**
 - Designed and tested for specific environments
 - Examples :
 - Aerospace, Military, Automotive, Medical, Extended Performance/Temperature-Commercial (EP), and Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS).
- **Aerospace Grade (Class S/Grade 1/Level 1)**
 - Traditional choice for space usage.
 - Relatively few available parts and their performance lags behind commercial counterparts (speed, power).
- **NEPP has a long history of evaluating grades other than Aerospace or Military.**
 - Current focus is on Automotive and Commercial.



NEPP FOR THE NEW FRONTIER – “COST CONSCIOUS MISSIONS”: *IS BETTER THE ENEMY OF GOOD ENOUGH?*

Does it HAVE to work or do you just WANT it to work?



Options for Cost-Conscious Missions

- **General Options:**
 - Use existing resources, spare parts, residual hardware
 - Use lower Grades of EEE parts, such as Automotive
 - Alternate screening/qualification approaches,
 - Fault tolerance through redundancy.

“A typical new car is equipped with more than 50 computers, designed to operate under extreme conditions for extended periods of time.”

<http://semiengineering.com/week-35-automotive-at-dac/>



Automotive Electronics – NEPP Tasks

- **Develop a body of knowledge (BOK) document, highlighting the Automotive Electronics Council (AEC) documents as well as discussions with manufacturers.**
 - **Summary implies a need for “relationships” between vendor and buyer is necessary to coordinate screening/qualification requirements.**



Do We Need Traditional Parts Screening/Qualification?

- **Traditional testing developed as a conservative means of bounding risk using temperature and voltage acceleration**
- **Are alternate approaches adequate for lower cost missions?**
- **Board level tests – how do they correlate to part level tests?**
 - **Modern boards usually have localized power conversion.**
 - **Implies changes to input voltages may not accelerate degradation due to voltage regulation.**
 - **Besides the stress mechanisms,**
 - **Board level has limits on input/output capabilities, operational tests, and visibility of “failures”.**
- **Appropriate sample size for statistics?**



Fault Tolerance to Increase “Parts” Reliability?

- Means to make a system more “reliable/available” can occur at many levels:
 - Operational
 - Ex., no operation in the South Atlantic Anomaly (proton hazard)
 - System
 - Ex., redundant boxes/busses or swarms (with spares) of nanosats
 - Circuit/software
 - Ex., error detection and correction (EDAC) of memory devices
 - Device (part)
 - Ex., triple-modular redundancy (TMR) voting of internal logic within the device
 - Transistor
 - Ex., use of annular transistors for TID improvement
 - Material
 - Ex., addition of an epi substrate to reduce SEE charge collection (or other substrate engineering)

The question remains:

How effective is the fault tolerance in increasing reliability?



Will Fault Tolerance Work When We Haven't Tested the Parts?

- **The System May Work, But What Level of Confidence Exists That It Will?**
 - What are the “unknown unknowns”? Can we account for them?
 - How do you calculate risk with unscreened EEE parts?
 - Do you have common mode failure potential in your design
 - How to adequately validate a fault tolerant system for space?
- **If we go back to the “Matrix”, how critical is your function and harsh your environment/lifetime?**

***Good engineers can invent infinite solutions,
but the solution used must be adequately validated and the risks accepted.***



Summary

- **NEPP is an agency-wide program that endeavors to provide added-value to the greater aerospace community.**
 - Always looking at the big picture (widest potential space usage of evaluated technologies and NEPP products).
 - We look to the future by learning from our past.
- **We've provided some thoughts on EEE Parts Assurance for Cost-Conscious Missions.**
 - Knowledge is always key



BACK-UP





Comments on the “Matrix” Wording

- “Optional” – implies that you might get away without this, but there’s possible risk if you don’t.
- “Suggested” – implies that it is a good idea to do this, and there’s some increased risk if you don’t.
- “Recommended” – implies that this should be done and there’s probable risk if you don’t.
- Where just the item is listed (ex., “full upscreening on COTS”) – this should be done to meet the criticality and environment/lifetime concerns. There is definite risk if you don’t

Good mission planning identifies where on the matrix a mission/application lies.